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CHAPTER 37
MORTGAGEFORECLOSURE
Section
78-37-1. Form of action - Judgment - Special execution.
78-37-2. Deficiency judgment - Execution.
78-37-3. Necessary parties - Unrecorded
rights barred.
78-37-4. Sales Disposition of surplus
moneys.
78-37-5. Sales - When debt due in installments.

78-37-1.

Form of action-

Section
78-37-6. Right of redemption - Sales by parcels - Of land and water stock.
78-37-7. Repealed.
78-37-8. Restraining possessor from injuring
property.
78-37-9. Attorney fees.

Judgment-

Special execution.

There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of
any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due, with costs and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing
costs, and directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to the
provisions of law. relating to sales on execution, and a special execution or
order of sale shall be issued for that purpose.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-37-1; L. 1965, ch. 172, § 1.
Cross-References. - Execution and pro-

ceedings supplemental
thereto,
U.R.C.P.
Trust deeds, § 57-1-19 et seq.

Rule

69,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action for deficiency.
Applicability of section.
Defenses.
Exclusive remedy.
Exhaustion of security.
Legislative intent.
Limitation to single suit.
Nature of action.
Pleading.
Sales.
Service of process.
Action for deficiency.
Former statute held not bar to action at law
for deficiency remaining after sale under
power in trust deed failed to realize full
amount of note secured by such deed. Mallory
v. Kessler, 18 Utah 11, 54 P. 892, 72 Am. St. R.
765 (1898).
Applicability of section.
Pledge was not mortgage within meaning of
former § 104-55-1. Campbell v. Peter, 108
Utah 565, 162 P.2d 754 (1945).

The rights of a creditor secured by a pledge
of personal property are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, not this section. Kennedy v. Bank of Ephraim, 594 P.2d 881 (Utah
1979).
This section applies only to actions between
mortgagors and mortgagees and was not applicable in a suit by mortgagee for an accounting
against the purchaser of mortgaged personalty.
Pillsbury Mills v. Nephi Processing Plant, 7
Utah 2d 286, 323 P.2d 266 (1958).
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Defenses.
Though tax deed through which defendant
claimed, because of its alleged imperfections,
and because of irregularities in tax proceedings, was inoperative to convey good title, this
did not prevent defendant from invoking aid of
statute of limitations in suit by mortgagee to
foreclosure mortgage, since equitable lien acquired by payment of taxes gave defendant interest in property. Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah
203, 87 P. 674 (1906).
Mortgagor may interpose defense of failure
of consideration, either as counterclaim in foreclosure proceeding or as cross-demand. If such
failure of consideration amounts to a sum in
excess of balance due on purchase money,
mortgagee has no standing in court. Stewart
Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 105 Utah 529, 144 P.2d
276 (1943).
Exclusive remedy.
The remedy provided for by this section was
exclusive and precluded action for breach of
contract. Coburn v. Bartholomew, 50 Utah
566, 167 P. 1156 (1917).
This section is directly contrary to common
law by which creditor had right to waive the
security and bring action. Smith v. Jarman, 61
Utah 125, 211 P. 962 (1922).
Foreclosure is statutory; foreclosure proceedings on a mortgage securing a note in default
must be conducted in accordance with the statutes. Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 105 Utah
529, 144 P.2d 276 (1943).
Exhaustion of security.
The security must be, in fact, exhausted and
a deficiency established to a certainty in order
to permit a junior mortgagee to bring an action
on the note without first exhausting the security; junior mortgagee failed to show that the
security was without value, and having failed
to first exhaust its security, was precluded by
the "one action rule" from pursuing its action
on the note where the junior mortgagee
brought its action on the note prior to the consummation of a foreclosure action prosecuted
by a first mortgagee. Lockhart Co. v. Equitable
Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983).
Agreement reserving option on part of seller
to compel buyer to forfeit all his title and interest to property held not to constitute a mortgage, and seller could maintain action on notes
without exhausting security. Nielson v. Smith,
81 Utah 440, 19 P.2d 767 (1933).
Under first provision of this section, security
must be exhausted as to quantity and value
before other property of debtor can be resorted
to for payment of debt. Salt Lake Valley Loan
& Trust Co. v. Millspaugh, 18 Utah 283, 54 P.
893 (1898).
Bank was not authorized to apply amount of
deposit in bank by mortgagor on mortgage loan
until after exhaustion of security leaving bal-
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ance due and unpaid for which deficiency judgment could be entered. Zion's Sav. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Rouse, 86 Utah 574, 47 P.2d 617
(1935).
Mortgagee must first exhaust the security
before he can claim the right to levy on any
other assets of the debtor; mortgagor might require mortgagee to offset any funds of debtor
on deposit with such mortgagee to either reduce or extinguish mortgage debt, but such
right to require an offset was vested in mortgagor, not in mortgagee. Stewart Livestock Co.
v. Ostler, 105 Utah 529, 144 P.2d 276 (1943).
Mortgagee is required to exhaust its security
by foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property before it can reach the general assets of
the debtor by writ of attachment. Bank of
Ephraim v. Davis, 581 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1978).
Mortgaged property constitutes primary
fund or thing to which mortgagor must first
resort for discharge of debt, and he can have
personal recourse against his debtor only after
this fund has been exhausted. Boucofski v.
Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 26 L.R.A.
(n.s.) 898 (1909); Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45
Utah 320, 145 P. 1036 (1915).
Until the mortgaged property was sold and
proceeds of sale were applied in discharge of
mortgage, there was no personal liability on
part of mortgagor, and personal liability of
mortgagor could not, without his consent, be
enforced until after sale and for deficiency
only. Hammond v. Wall, 51 Utah 464, 171 P.
148 (1918).
Under this section and § 78-37-2 there is no
personal liability on part of mortgagor until
after a foreclosure sale of the security, and
then only for the deficiency remaining unpaid;
a mortgagee may not have a personal judgment against a mortgagor until the security
has been first exhausted. First Nat'! Bank v.
Boley, 90 Utah 341, 61 P.2d 621 (1936); Boley
v. District Court ex rel. Morgan County, 90
Utah 347, 61 P.2d 624 (1936).
If security has been lost without mortgagee's
fault, an action may be maintained directly
upon the personal obligation evidenced by the
note without going through the idle and fruitless procedure of foreclosure; judgment foreclosing first mortgage did not preclude second
mortgagee from bringing suit on notes where
sale of mortgaged premises did not produce sufficient money to pay off even the first mortgage. Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan
Lodge, No. 1453, 88 Utah 577, 56 P.2d 1046
(1936).
Where debt is secured, security holder cannot maintain an action for personal judgment
without first exhausting remedy against the
security, in absence of any showing that security has become valueless. National Bank of
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Commerce v. James Pingree Co., 62 Utah 259,
218 P. 552 (1923).

Credit Corp. v. Von Hake, 511 F. Supp. 634 (D.
Utah 1981).

Legislative intent.
By former § 104-55-1, the legislature contemplated the joining of an action at law and a
suit in equity in the same action. Petty v.
Clark, 102 Utah 186, 129 P.2d 568 (1942).

Pleading.
Before the whole of the property mortgaged
could be ordered to be sold under § 248 of the
former Practice Act, and the entire debt and
costs ordered to be paid with proper rebate of
interest, complaint had to base plaintiffs
rights upon the statute, and contain the necessary averments to bring the case within the
provisions of that section of the said Practice
Act. Dan Hartog v. Tibbitts, 1 Utah 328 (1876).

Limitation to single suit.
Where mortgagee foreclosed mortgage in action in which person to whom title had been
conveyed was inadvertently not made party,
mortgagee could not maintain action against
such title holder for purpose of extinguishing
such person's equity of redemption without
having former foreclosure decree set aside,
since allowance of such action would be allowing two actions on same debt and such equity
of redemption could not be extinguished or title
vested in another except by lawful foreclosure
and sale. Mickleson v. Anderson, 81 Utah 444,
19 P.2d 1033 (1933).
Evidence sustained trial court's finding that
defendants' failure to disclose the true financial position of their company was a material
misrepresentation which was relied upon by
the plaintiff and constituted actionable fraud.
Utah Nat'l Bank v. Oliver, 523 P.2d 1222
(Utah 1974).
Where there were two separate mortgages,
securing separate debts, although on the same
property, personal representatives of deceased
mortgagee ought to have foreclosed both mortgages in one suit, but since there had been no
sale under first judgment and both causes had
been consolidated without objection before trial
of second suit, lien of mortgage foreclosed in
second suit was not lost by reason of first suit.
Thompson v. Skeen, 14 Utah 209, 46 P. 1103
(1896).
A party having one suit, either pending or in
judgment, for a debt secured by mortgage or
other lien on real estate, cannot have another
action for the recovery of the same debt. His
whole claim must be embraced in one suit. Bacon v. Raybould, 4 Utah 357, 10 P. 481, 11 P.
510 (1886). This language was disapproved in
Thompson v. Skeen, 14 Utah 209, 46 P. 1103
(1896).
Nature of action.
Proceeding to foreclose upon a mortgage is
an action in rem or quasi in rem. 1ST Nat'l

Sales.
A valid foreclosure sale results in the satisfaction of a specific mortgage debt from the
sale proceeds attributable to the encumbered
property; where multiple parcels of realty are
offered at a single foreclosure sale, the proceeds from each parcel are applied to satisfy
only the related mortgage debt. Bawden &
Assocs. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 711 (Utah 1982).
Reference in this section to sales on execution has merely procedural significance; it does
not attempt to define or fix any rights of the
mortgagor or mortgagee in reference to the
property. Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, 96
Utah 97, 85 P.2d 770 (1938).
Service of process.
Action to foreclose mortgage is essentially
action in rem, and can be prosecuted just as
successfully upon constructive service insofar
as property only is sought to be reached as it
can by personal service upon mortgagor, the
only difference being that in case of constructive notice no personal judgment in action may
be obtained against mortgagor for any deficiency that may exist after sale, while, if personal service is obtained upon him within
state, judgment may be rendered, and general
execution issued thereon.
Boucofski v.
Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 26 L.R.A.
(n.s.) 898 (1909).
Mortgage foreclosure decree could not be collaterally attacked for mortgagee's failure to
serve proper representative of estate of deceased mortgagor, where defendants in that action defaulted, no appeal was taken and foreclosure decree had become final, and where
foreclosure record did not show such error or
defect on its face. Zion's Ben. Bldg. Soc. v.
Geary, 112 Utah 548, 189 P.2d 964 (1948).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Equitable Considerations of Mortgage Foreclosure and Redemption in Utah: A Need for Remedial Legislation,
1976 Utah L. Rev. 327.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages
§ 536 et seq.

C.J.S. - 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 604 et seq.
A.L.R. - Rights of holder of "first refusal"
option on real property in event of sale at foreclosure or other involuntary sale, 17 A.L.R.3d
962.
Validity, construction, and application of
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clause entitling mortgagee to acceleration of
balance due in case of conveyance of mortgaged
property, 69 A.L.R.3d 713; 22 A.L.R.4th 1266.
Failure to keep up insurance as justifying

78-37-2.

Deficiency

foreclosure under acceleration prov1s1on in
mortgage or deed of trust, 69 A.L.R.3d 774.
Key Numbers. - Mortgages e=> 380 et seq.

judgment

-

Execution.

If it appears from the return of the officer making the sale that the proceeds
are insufficient and a balance still remains due, judgment therefor must then
be docketed by the clerk and execution may be issued for such balance as in
other cases; but no general execution shall issue until after the sale of the
mortgaged property and the application of the amount realized as aforesaid.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-37-2.
Cross-References. - Execution and pro-

ceedings
U.R.C.P.

supplemental

thereto,

Rule

69,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Clerk's duties.
-Entry of judgment.
--Allowed.
--Not
allowed.
Garnishment.
-When allowed.
Liability of spouse.
-Failure to sign note.
Prerequisites.
-Officer's report.
-Valid sale.
--Lack
of proper service.
Sale of property.
-Inadequacy of price.
-Separate
parcels.
Sheriffs deed.
-Rights conveyed.
Statute of limitations.
-Judgment
against grantee.

Clerk's duties.
-Entry

of judgment.

--Allowed.
Entry of deficiency judgment is a mere ministerial duty of clerk; trial court is not called
upon to confirm sale of mortgaged property.
First Nat'l Bank v. Haymond, 89 Utah 151, 57
P.2d 1401 (1936).
--Not
allowed.
Under this section the clerk, in suit for foreclosure of a mortgage, has no power or authority whatsoever to enter personal judgment by
default and for attorney's fees; a judgment rendered in foreclosure proceedings must be by the
court and not by the clerk, and his authority to
enter a personal judgment is limited to cases
where return of officer shows a deficiency in

proceeds of sale under foreclosure to satisfy
mortgage, but the amount of attorney's fees requires a judicial determination which can only
be exercised by the court. First N at'l Bank v.
Boley, 90 Utah 341, 61 P.2d 621 (1936); Boley
v. District Court ex rel. Morgan County, 90
Utah 347, 61 P.2d 624 (1936).
Garnishment.
-When allowed.
Writ of garnishment will not lie in action to
foreclose mortgage until deficiency judgment
has been duly entered. Blue Creek Land &
Livestock Co. v. Kehrer, 60 Utah 62, 206 P.
287 (1922).
Liability of spouse.
-Failure to sign note.
Deficiency judgment could not be entered

555

78-37-2

JUDICIAL CODE

against spouse signing mortgage but not signing note secured thereby. Consolidated Wagon
& Mach. Co. v. Kay, 81 Utah 595, 21 P.2d 836
(1933).

Prerequisites.
-Officer's report.
Under this section it is immaterial whether
the complaint contains a prayer for any deficiency in case the mortgaged property does not
bring enough to satisfy the decree. But a deficiency judgment cannot be rendered or docketed until the officer makes his report showing
such deficiency, for until such report, the
amount of the deficiency cannot be known. Decree of foreclosure must find amount of money
due, the defendant personally liable to pay it
must be ascertained, and the officer or person
making sale must specify in his return amount
of deficiency, if any; and the clerk must docket
judgment• for the amount; and then it has the
effect of other judgments. In this regard, fact
that decree was upon a default was immaterial. Russell v. Hank, 9 Utah 309, 34 P. 245
(1893).
-Valid sale.
Deficiency judgment cannot properly be entered until after the property has been sold and
the sale proceeds applied. Donaldson v. Grant,
15 Utah 231, 49 P. 779 (1897); Boucofski v.
Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 26 L.R.A.
(n.s.) 898 (1909); Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45
Utah 320, 145 P. 1036 (1915); Hammond v.
Wall, 51 Utah 464, 171 P. 148 (1918); First
Nat'! Bank v. Haymond, 89 Utah 151, 57 P.2d
1401 (1936); In re Reynolds' Estate, 90 Utah
415, 62 P.2d 270 (1936).
--Lack
of proper service.
Valid sale on execution is a condition precedent to obtaining a deficiency judgment, and
where default judgment of foreclosure was void
for lack of proper service upon corporation, deficiency decree was likewise a nullity. Reader
v. District Court ex rel. Uintah County, 98
Utah 1, 94 P.2d 858 (1939).
Sale of property.
-Inadequacy
of price.
Mortgagee is entitled to have mortgaged
property sold at foreclosure sale and, if property does not sell for enough to satisfy mortgage debt, to have deficiency judgment entered
in the usual way even if value of mortgaged

property exceeds debt owed; court's equitable
powers may be exercised only after sale upon
proper application by party claiming to be injured; whether inadequacy of price and lack of
market due to depression were sufficient
grounds for setting aside sale was not at issue
before reviewing court where no motion for
such relief was presented to trial court. First
Nat'! Bank v. Haymond, 89 Utah 151, 57 P.2d
1401 (1936).

-Separate
parcels.
Where two parcels of realty, subject to separate mortgages executed by the same mortgagor to the same mortgagee, were foreclosed in
the same action with judgment being awarded
for a combined amount, and the evidence established that one of the parcels was offered
and sold separately at the foreclosure sale and
that the other parcel remained unsold, it was
error for trial court to apply the sale price
against the combined amount awarded in the
foreclosure judgment and award a deficiency
judgment for the remaining balance; if the sale
price was less than the portion of the foreclosure judgment, plus costs, secured by the sold
parcel, a deficiency judgment could have been
awarded for such difference; however, before
deficiency judgment could be entered with respect to the unsold parcel, such parcel would
have to be sold and the proceeds applied
against the indebtedness and costs secured
thereby. Bawden & Assocs. v. Smith, 646 P.2d
711 (Utah 1982).
Sheriff's deed.
-Rights conveyed.
Sheriffs deed for real property purchased at
execution sale conveyed only the rights of the
judgment debtor, and thus, the deed was subject to the foreclosure of prior trust deed-mortgage. Clawson v. Moesser, 535 P.2d 77 (Utah
1975).
Statute of limitations.
-Judgment
against grantee.
Mortgagee's right to recover deficiency judgment against grantee of mortgaged realty,
who, as part of consideration for conveyance,
ornlly agreed to pay mortgages, held barred by
statute of limitations, where action to foreclose
was not brought until after lapse of statutory
period following time when mortgage notes became due. Thompson v. Cheesman, 15 Utah 43,
48 P. 477 (1897).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages

§ 905 et seq.

C.J.S. - 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 774 et seq.
A.L.R. - Conflict oflaws as to application of
statute proscribing or limiting availability of

action for deficiency after sale of collateral real
estate, 44 A.L.R.3d 922.
Effect upon obligation of guarantor or surety
of statute forbidding or restricting deficiency
judgments, 49 A.L.R.3d 554.
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Key Numbers. - Mortgages ""' 555 et seq.

78-37-3.

Necessary

parties -

Unrecorded

rights barred.

No person holding a conveyance from or under the mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or having a lien thereon, which conveyance or lien does not
appear of record in the proper office at the time of the commencement of the
action, need be made a party to such action, and the judgment therein rendered, and the proceedings therein had, are as conclusive against the party
holding such unrecorded conveyance or lien as if he had been made a party to
the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-37-3.
Cross-References.
County recorder,
Chapter 21 of Title 17.

Necessary joinder
U.R.C.P.
Parties defendant
U.R.C.P.

of parties,

Rule

19,

generally,

Rule

17,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Equitable mortgage.
-Grantee of mortgagor.
Holders of prior liens.
-Proper parties.
Land not included in mortgage.
Quitclaim deed.
Equitable mortgage.
-Grantee of mortgagor.
This section did not operate to excuse person
claiming equitable mortgage from making
grantee of mortgagor party to foreclosure proceeding. Federal Land Bank v. Pace, 87 Utah
156, 48 P.2d 480, 102 A.L.R. 819 (1935).
Holders of prior liens.
-Proper parties.
Prior lienors or encumbrancers are proper
but not necessary parties to mortgage foreclosure actions. Graham v. Oakden, 51 Utah 476,
170 P. 451 (1918).
Land not included in mortgage.
Where, after mortgage was executed on certain tract of land, owner executed deed to
grantee on property not included in mortgage,

which deed was not recorded, decree in action
to foreclose mortgage on tract ofland including
part conveyed to grantee was not binding on
grantee who was not party to such action. Federal Land Bank v. Pace, 87 Utah 156, 48 P.2d
480, 102 A.L.R. 819 (1935).
Quitclaim deed.
Under quitclaim deeds from mortgagors to
son and from mortgagors and son to son's wife,
the latter acquired no interest which gave her
any rights superior to mortgage, or which
would require that she be made party defendant to foreclosure proceedings, where deeds
were unrecorded at time of suit, and wife's interest was as effectively cut off by the foreclosure suit as though she had been made party
thereto. Gigliotti v. Albergo, 100 Utah 392, 115
P.2d 791 (1941).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages

C.J.S. - 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §§ 592, 627.
Key Numbers. - Mortgages ""' 427(4).

§§ 569 to 571.

557

78-37-4

78-37-4.

JUDICIAL CODE

Sales -

Disposition

of surplus moneys.

If there is surplus money remaining after payment of the amount due on the
mortgage, lien or encumbrance, with costs, the court may cause the same to be
paid to the person entitled to it, and in the meantime may direct it to be
deposited in court.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-37-4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Junior mortgagee.
Junior mortgagee, who was made party to
foreclosure suit by senior mortgagee, and who
was bound by decree which barred him from
any right in property and barred all equity of

redemption in property, was not precluded
from claiming surplus from foreclosure sale by
reason of failure to assert his rights by crossbill or otherwise. Cowan v. Stoker, 100 Utah
377, 115 P.2d 153 (1941).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages

C.J.S. - 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 799.
Key Numbers. - Mortgages
567.

§ 930 et seq.

78-37-5.

Sales -

When debt due in installments.

If the debt for which the mortgage, lien or encumbrance is held is not all
due, then as soon as sufficient of the property has been sold to pay the amount
due, with costs, the sale must cease, and afterwards, as often as more becomes
due on principal or interest, the court may, on motion, order more to be sold.
But if the property cannot be sold in portions without injury to the parties, the
whole may be ordered to be sold in the first instance, and the entire debt and
costs paid, but there shall be a rebate of interest where such rebate is proper.
•History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-37-5.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Motion for further proceedings.
-Notice.
--Service.
Notice of motion for further foreclosure and
sale need not be served on mortgagor's judg-

ment creditor, although later redeemed from
original sale, but only on attorney for mortgagor. Dupee v. Salt Lake Valley Loan & Trust
Co., 20 Utah 103, 57 P. 845, 77 Am. St. R. 902
(1899).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages

§ 556.
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Key Numbers. - Mortgages
512.

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE

78-37-6

78-37-6. Right of redemption - Sales by parcels - Of land
and water stock.
Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and liens
are subject to redemption as in case of sales under executions generally. In all
cases where the judgment directs the sale of land, together with shares of
corporate stock evidencing title to a water right used or intended to be used, or
suitable for use, on the land, the court shall equitably apportion such water
stock to the land, or some part thereof, in one or more parcels, as it may deem
suitable for the sale thereof, and the land and water stock in each parcel shall
be sold together, and for the purpose of such sale shall be regarded as real
estate and subject to redemption as above specified. In all sales of real estate
under foreclosure the court may determine the parcels and the order in which
such parcels of property shall be sold.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-37-6.

Cross-References. - Redemption from execution sale, Rule 69(0, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Construction of section.
Extension of time to redeem.
-Bankruptcy.
-Equity.
Growing crops.
-Chattel mortgage.
Objection to sale.
-After sale.
Personal property.
Possession during redemption period.
-Assignee of mortgagor.
-Rent.
Release of equity of redemption.
-Adequate consideration.
Rights of creditors.
-Judgment
creditor.
Sale in parcels or in gross.
-Mortgage description.
Validity of sale.
-Statutory
compliance.

Construction of section.
This section is more than procedural; it confers and defines the extent of the right to redeem, as well as providing the method in
which a redemption shall be made. Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, 96 Utah 297, 85 P.2d 770
(1938).

ercises his right of redemption during period
provided by law, that right is lost. Layton v.
Layton, 105 Utah 1, 140 P.2d 759 (1943).

Extension of time to redeem.

-Equity.
A court sitting in equity has discretion to
extend the time period ofredemption. Mollerup
v. Storage Systems Int'!, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah
1977).

-Bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy does not extend time of redemption, for right of redemption is a property right
belonging to estate of bankrupt, but mortgagee
is no longer a creditor of bankrupt so far as
security is concerned, and unless bankrupt ex-

-Chattel mortgage.
Mortgage not specifically covering rents, issues, and profits of real estate was inferior to
chattel mortgage on crops executed after mort-

Growing crops.
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gage on realty but prior to institution of foreclosure proceedings; and chattel mortgagee
was entitled to proceeds of sale of crop harvested prior to foreclosure of realty mortgage.
Carlquist v. Coltharp, 67 Utah 514,248 P. 481,
47 A.L.R. 765 (1926).

premises during the redemption period, even
though owner-mortgagor does not redeem. Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, 96 Utah 297, 85
P.2d 770 (1938).

Objection to sale.

-Adequate
consideration.
A subsequent release or transfer of mortgagor's equity of redemption may be made to mortgagee, but when attacked it will be scrutinized
so as to prevent any unfair advantage being
taken of debtor; release must be supported by
adequate consideration and will not be inferred
from equivocal and loose expressions. Corey v.
Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.2d 940 (1933).

-After sale.
Judgment debtor has no right to object to
foreclosure sale after redemption is accomplished, since by redemption the sale is terminated and he is restored to his estate; and any
irregularities
in the foreclosure sale are
waived. Bennion v. Amoss, 530 P.2d 810 (Utah
1975).
Personal property.
In mandamus proceedings to compel sheriff
to execute and deliver to redemptioner deed for
certain mining claims and properties sold at
mortgage foreclosure sale, fact that plaintiff
was seeking to redeem personal property as
well as real property, and that deed submitted
to sheriff for execution called for transfer of
personal property not subject to redemption,
held not error, where so-called "personal property" was treated as real property in mortgage
and judgment of foreclosure. Williams v.
Corless, 59 Utah 137, 202 P. 834 (1921).
Possession

during redemption period.

-Assignee
of mortgagor.
Since mortgagor has legal title and mortgagee merely a lien, mortgagor, in absence of
provision to contrary in mortgage, is entitled to
retain possession until expiration of redemption period, and such rights of possession and
redemption passed to assignee of mortgagor
who purchased prior to institution of foreclosure proceedings. Carlquist v. Coltharp, 67
Utah 514, 248 P. 481, 47 A.L.R. 765 (1926).
-Rent.
Owner-mortgagor who is in actual possession of real estate from the time of sale under
mortgage foreclosure to expiration of the redemption period is not liable to the mortgageepurchaser at the sale for the rental value of the

Release of equity of redemption.

Rights of creditors.
--Judgment creditor.
Judgment creditor may redeem property sold
at foreclosure sale. Williams v. Corless, 59
Utah 137, 202 P. 834 (1921).
Sale in parcels or in gross.
Sale of property en masse is proper if bids for
separate parcels cannot be had. Adams v.
Pratt, 87 Utah 80, 48 P.2d 444 (1935).
-Mortgage description.
In mortgage foreclosure proceeding, where it
appeared from language of mortgage itself that
property in question was described and mortgaged as separate parcels, not as a unit, it was
held that mortgagor had right to demand that
parcels be sold separately. Cole v. Canton Mining Co., 59 Utah 140, 202 P. 830 (l921).
Validity of sales.
-Statutory compliance.
Foreclosure sale proceedings, and the rights
of parties under them, are fixed at time highest
bids are accepted by sheriff, and, in absence of
gross irregularities, mistake, fraud, or collusion practiced on part of participants, sale,
when made as directed by court, in compliance
with statutes, must of necessity be held valid
and binding and rights of all interested parties
fixed and determined thereby. Cole v. Canton
Mining Co., 59 Utah 140, 202 P. 830 (1921).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages
§ 864 et seq.
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813 et seq.
A.L.R. - Right of junior mortgagee, whose
mortgage covers only a part of land subject to
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1362.
Constitutionality, construction, and application of statute as to effect of taking appeal, or
staying execution, on right to redeem from execution or judicial sale, 44 A.L.R.4th 1229.
Key Numbers. - Mortgages eco512, 591 et
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Repealed.

Repeals. - Section 78-37-7 (L. 1951, ch. 58,
§ l; C. 1943, Supp.,§ 104-37-7), relating to redemption on sales under trust deeds, was re-
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Restraining

pealed by Laws 1961, ch. 181, § 19. For
present provisions relating to trust deeds, see
§ 57-1-19 et seq.

possessor

from injuring property.

The court or judge may by injunction, on good cause shown, restrain the
party in possession from doing any act to the injury of real property during the
foreclosure of a mortgage thereon, or after a sale on execution.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-37-8.
Cross-References.
- Execution and pro-

ceedings supplemental thereto, Rule
U.R.C.P.
Injunctions, Rule 65A, U.R.C.P.

69,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 55 Arn. Jur. 2d Mortgages
§ 319.
C.J.S. - 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §§ 334, 660.
A.L.R. - Mortgagor's interference with
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property subject to order of foreclosure and sale
as contempt of court, 54 A.L.R.3d 1242.
Key Numbers. - Mortgages e=> 205, 465,
465½.

Attorney fees.

In all cases of foreclosure when an attorney's fee is claimed by the plaintiff,
the amount thereof shall be fixed by the court, any stipulation to the contrary
notwithstanding; provided, no other or greater amount shall be allowed or
decreed than the sum which shall appear by the evidence to be actually
charged by and to be paid to the attorney for the plaintiff. If it shall appear
that there is an agreement or understanding to divide such fees between the
plaintiff and his attorney, or between the attorney and any other person
except an attorney associated with him in the cause, only the amount to be
retained by the attorney or attorneys shall be decreed as against the defendant.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-37-9.

Cross-References. ally, lien, § 78-51-41.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
-Unsecured note.
Duty of court.
-Stipulation
of parties.
Evidence to support award.
-Suggestion by plaintiffs counsel.
-Testimony of other attorneys.
Excessive fee.
-Objection.
--Waiver.
Lien of attorney.
-Discharge.
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Purpose of section.
-Preventing
division of fees.
-Protection against excessive fees.
"Reasonable" fee.
Applicability

of section.

-Unsecured
note.
This section relates exclusively to foreclosure proceedings, and has no application to
note not secured by mortgage. Utah Nat'l Bank
v. Nelson, 38 Utah 169, 111 P. 907 (1911).
Duty of court.
-Stipulation
of parties.
Under this section, the trial court cannot escape the responsibility of determining and declaring what amount shall be allowed as an
attorney's fee despite any stipulation of the
• parties upon that subject contained in either
note or mortgage. Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45
Utah 320; 145 P. 1036 (1915).
Evidence to support award.
An award of attorney fees must be based
upon findings of fact which must, in turn, be
based on the evidence unless such fee award is
not disputed or objected to by the opposing
party. F.M.A. Fin. Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah
2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965).
-Suggestion
by plaintiff's counsel.
Attorney fee awarded to plaintiff at a mortgage foreclosure hearing on the basis of a suggestion by plaintiffs counsel after defendant's
counsel had left the courtroom was improper
where there was no evidence or sworn testimony to support the award and no specified
amount was prayed for or pleaded by plaintiff.
Utah Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Nunley, 17 Utah 2d
348, 411 P.2d 838 (1966).
-Testimony
of other attorneys.
Court was authorized to hear testimony of
other attorneys to aid it in fixing reasonable
fee, though mortgage had provided for definite
amount for such fee. Kurtz v. Ogden Canyon
Sanitarium Co., 37 Utah 313, 108 P. 14 (1910).
In case the court has insufficient data upon
which to base a finding, or even though it has
such data, it may nevertheless call to its assistance attorneys engaged in the practice and
take their judgment under oath respecting
amount that would be reasonable in any given
case. Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 145
P. 1036 (1915).
Excessive

fee.

-Objection.
--Waiver.
Even though a plaintiffs attorney's fee in a

foreclosure action was excessive, the award
may nevertheless be upheld if, at trial, the defense attorney objected to the plaintiff attorney's offer to testify with regard to the fee, and
the trial court erroneously sustained the objection. Associated Indus. Devs., Inc. v. Jewkes,
701 P.2d 486 (Utah 1985).
Lien of attorney.
-Discharge.
Where attorney's fee has been allowed by
court in foreclosure suit, and amount of fee has
been adjudicated and made part of judgment,
attorney has interest in judgment and lien
thereon to extent of amount allowed, and lien
cannot be discharged by payment to anyone
except attorney who, to amount of lien, is
deemed equitable assignee of judgment. Gray
v. Denhalter, 17 Utah 312, 53 P. 976 (1898).
Purpose of section.
-Preventing
division of fees.
Statute was enacted to prevent division of
fees provided for in mortgage between attorney
and mortgagee and to allow only such reasonable attorney's fees to be taxed against defendant as were actually agreed to be paid, or
were paid, for attorney's services. McClure v.
Little, 15 Utah 379, 49 P. 298, 62 Am. St. R.
938 (1897).
-Protection
against excessive fees.
This section was adopted to protect debtors
against being required to pay excessive attorney's fees in foreclosure suits. It was not, however, intended that personal actions upon notes
should be affected. Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45
Utah 320, 145 P. 1036 (1915).
"Reasonable" fee.
This section contemplates a reasonable sum
as an attorney's fee, independently of provisions of note or mortgage. By a "reasonable
fee," is meant one which is reasonable under
the facts and circumstances of each case, which
must depend upon the amount in controversy,
the labor and the responsibility imposed upon
the attorney in obtaining judgment. A smaller
fee would be more reasonable in a default case
than in a contested one. Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 145 P. 1036 (1915).
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CHAPTER 38
NUISANCE, WASTE, AND OTHER
DAMAGE
Section
78-38-1.
78-38-2.
.78-38-3.
78-38-4.
78-38-4.5.

78-38-4.6.
78-38-4.7.

78-38-1.

"Nuisance" defined - Right of action for - Judgment.
Right of action for waste - Damages.
Right of action for injuries to trees
- Damage.
Limited damages in certain cases.
Proof of ownership required to harvest or transport forest products
or native vegetation - Definitions - Requirements for proof
of ownership.
Enforcement.
Transportation of forest products

Section

or native vegetation into or
through the state.
78-38-4.8. Exemptions.
78-38-4.9. Violation as misdemeanor.
78-38-5.
Manufacturing facility in operation over three years - Limited
application of nuisance provisions.
78-38-6.
"Manufacturing facility" defined.
78-38-7.
Agricultural operation of over
three years duration - Application of nuisance provisions
limited.
78-38-8.
"Agricultural operation" defined.

"Nuisance" defined - Right of action for - Judgment.

Anything which is mJurious to health, or indecent, or offensive to the
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance and the subject of an
action. Such action may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by [the] nuisance; and
by the judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or abated, and damages may
also be recovered.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
104-38-1.
Cross-References. - Criminal nuisances,
§ 76-10-801 et seq.
Supp.,

Municipal power to declare and abate nuisances, § 10-8-60.
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Animal rendering plant.
Carnival.
Causeway.
Cement plant.
Drive-in cafe.
Encroachment of building upon street.
Flume.
Gas plant.
Highways.
Industrial operations.
Injunction.
Municipal licensing.
Noise.
Oil refinery.
Pleading.
Pollution.
Prescripti°ve right.
Public nuisance.
Railroads.
Reasonable use.
Removal of natural windbreak.
Road transportation business.
Sound equipment.
Temporary or continuing nuisance.
Trees.

Animal rendering plant.
Where operation of animal rendering plant
resulted in emission of nauseating odors and
stenches, adjoining landowners, who were denied injunctive relief because of their delay in
applying therefor, were permitted to file
amended pleadings to obtain damages for depreciation of their property. Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221,
137 P.2d 347 (1943).
Fact that odor from rendering plant did not
make adjoining farm land less productive did
not preclude finding that odor diminished market value of the land since productivity was not
the only factor affecting market value of the
land. Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products
Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943).
Carnival.
Carnival held on street in city business district was an enjoinable and compensable nuisance where it attracted large crowds which
obstructed access to plaintiffs home and interfered with his health and enjoyment of his
home because of the crowd's noise and turmoil;
fact that carnival was temporary and that city
had licensed it was no defense. Brough v. Ute
Stampede Ass'n, 105 Utah 446, 142 P.2d 670
(1943).
Carnivals are not limited to particular areas
and known only to particular groups of people,
thus trial court could take judicial notice of the

kind of noises emanating from a carnival.
Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n, 105 Utah 446,
142 P.2d 670 (1943).

Causeway.
Corporations extracting salt, shrimp and
shrimp eggs from Great Salt Lake did not suffer special business damages not common to
the rest of the community from the changes m
salinity of the lake due to construction of
causeway across the lake; and therefore, they
were not entitled to injunction or damages for
private nuisance. Hardy Salt Co. v. Southern
Pac. Transp. Co., 501 F.2d 1156 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033, 95 S. Ct. 515, 42 L.
Ed. 2d 308 (1974).
Cement plant.
Action for damages to plaintiffs land due to
cement, dust and smoke emanating from defendant's cement plant was not barred where
brought ten years after plant's commencement
of operation; it was not barred by the threeyear statute of limitations since it was not an
action for trespass, and it was not barred by
the statute of limitations governing actions not
otherwise provided for since the nuisance constituted a recurring one rather than a continuing one. Thackery v. Union Portland Cement
Co., 64 Utah 437, 231 P. 813 (1924).
Drive-in cafe.
Operation of a drive-in cafe in a residential
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district is not a nuisance per se, but where defendant's cafe attracted teenagers whose conduct disturbed the peace and quiet of the
neighborhood and where the patrons created
loud and disturbing noises to the annoyance
and discomfort of the residents, plaintiff-residents were entitled to an injunction restricting
operation of the business and to monetary
damages. Wade v. Fuller, 12 Utah 2d 299, 365
P.2d 802, 91 A.L.R.2d 569 (1961).

Encroachment of building upon street.
Merchant whose display windows were obscured to some extent by remodeled front of
adjoining bank which encroached upon street
right of way was entitled to damages but not to
injunction compelling bank to remove encroaching portion of building where such removal would be expensive and seriously damage building and merchant, although aware of
impending encroachment, did not seek equitable relief until completion ofremodeling. Lewis
v. Pingree Nfl.t'l Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 P. 558,
1916C L.R.A. 1260 (1915).
In action by adjoining landowner against
bank which remodeled its building in such a
manner that it encroached upon street and partially obstructed plaintiffs display windows,
measure of damages to plaintiff was full depreciation in value of his property, lessening or
reducing its rental value. Lewis v. Pingree
Nat'! Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 P. 558, 1916C
L.R.A. 1260 (1915).
Flume.
Although defendant admittedly had right, by
use for more than forty years, to maintain
flume of certain height in street, across which
bridges were maintained for access to plaintiffs premises, it was properly enjoined from
increasing materially the height of the flume
and taking away the bridges. Hague v. Juab
County Mill & Elevator Co., 37 Utah 290, 107
P. 249 (1910).
Gas plant.
In action by 59 residents in vicinity of gas
plant to enjoin its operation on the ground that
fumes therefrom caused great inconvenience to
plaintiffs and their families, and sickness by
rea&on of nausea and headaches, held that,
plaintiffs having lived in the vicinity for many
years without earlier action or complaint as to
additions to the plant, equity should not enjoin
maintenance of the plant, but case would be
remanded for taking of testimony as to damages. Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53
Utah 10, 177 P. 418 (1918).
Highways.
Private citizens cannot maintain action for
abatement of irrigation ditch as nuisance on
public highway, where such ditch does not obstruct highway nor prevent ingress or egress
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from complainants' premises. Muir v. Kay, 66
Utah 550, 244 P. 901 (1925).

Industrial operations.
When an industry is of such a character that
it produces foul odors, those who are responsible for its operation have the duty to place it
where it will not result in injury to the property of others. The mere fact that there may
already exist in the area a condition which
may be obnoxious to some persons does not create a license for establishment of other more
offensive conditions. Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d
347 (1943).
Mere fact that an area is not incorporated in
a city or town with zoning regulations does not
warrant establishment therein of commercial
institutions which emit strong odors rendering
life unpleasant to the residents thereof. Nor
does fact that an industry may serve a useful
purpose or produce commercial commodities
warrant its location at a place which merely
suits the convenience of the owner or operator,
in utter disregard for the effect it has on the
value or enjoyment of other properties. Ludlow
v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah
221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943).
Injunction.
Where conduct of businesses is enjoined, the
injunction must be interpreted reasonably,
both by the parties and by the courts. Thompson v. Anderson, 107 Utah 331, 153 P.2d 665
(1944).
Municipal licensing.
In absence of legislation to the contrary a
city does not have the right, under its police
power, to license a nuisance on a public street
for purely private gain. Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n, 105 Utah 446, 142 P.2d 670 (1943).
Noise.
Sounds normally inherent in the nature of a
lawful business may under some circumstances
constitute a nuisance. Thompson v. Anderson,
107 Utah 331, 153 P.2d 665 (1944).
Oil refinery.
An oil refinery reasonably operated in a location suitable therefor is not liable for inconvenience resulting to householder in neighborhood because of disagreeable odors; liability for
injuries occasioned by fumes, gases, dust,
smoke, foul air, etc., cast upon one's property
by another, is not absolute. Dahl v. Utah Oil
Ref. Co., 71 Utah 1, 262 P. 269 (1927).
Pleading.
Under our system of pleading, it seemingly
makes little difference whether an action be
predicated upon the fact that conduct of defendant amounts to a nuisance to the damage of
plaintiffs property, or that it amounts to an
unconstitutional taking of such property with-
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out compensation. Lund v. Salt Lake County,
58 Utah 546, 200 P. 510 (1921).

Pollution.
County held not liable for pollution of plaintiffs' fish ponds due to water flowing into them
in course of cleaning and flushing reservoir, no
such injury being within the contemplation of
defendant county and the evidence being insufficient either to show negligence or a nuisance.
Lund v. Salt Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 200 P.
510 (1921).
Discharge into canal of water which renders
canal waters unfit for irrigation and domestic
purposes for which they are used creates nuisance. North Point Consol. Irrigation Co. v.
Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 16 Utah 246, 52
P. 168, 40 L.R.A. 851, 67 Am. St. R. 607 (1898).
Defendant could be held liable on either theory of strict liability or under the doctrine of
nuisance per se for thfi pollution of plaintiff's
culinary water wells caused by the percolation
of defendant's toxic formation waters, which
were stored on defendant's land, into the subterranean water system that fed plaintiff's
wells since the storage of the toxic formation
water in an area adjacent to plaintiff's wells
constituted an abnormally dangerous and inappropriate use of the land in light of its proximity to the plaintiff's property and was
unduly dangerous to the plaintiff's use of his
well water, and the acts of the defendant were
in violation of § 76-10-801 and former
§ 73-14-5, which was in effect at the time.
Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d
267 (Utah 1982).
Prescriptive right.
Use that will give prescriptive right to maintain private nuisance must be adverse, under
claim of right, uninterrupted, and continuous,
for twenty years, with knowledge and acquiescence of person whose right is invaded. North
Point Consol. Irrigation Co. v. Utah & Salt
Lake Canal Co., 16 Utah 246, 52 P. 168, 40
L.R.A. 851, 67 Am. St. R. 607 (1898).
Public nuisance.
Private persons may not invoke aid of courts
to abate public nuisances, unless they can
show that they suffer some special or peculiar
injury or damage not common to rest of community; but may do so, as well as seek damages, upon clearly showing substantial injury
not common to community; a "substantial injury" is one of"substantial character, not fleeting or evanescent." Lewis v. Pingree Nat'!
Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 P. 558, 1916C L.R.A.
1260 (1915).
Railroads.
Where there is no willful or negligent conduct, or any physical damage to the property of
plaintiff, fact that noise from the operation of
trains upon the tracks and in the yards of de-

fendant's nearby railroad interferes with religious services is neither ground for an injunction or for damages upon the theory of unlawful taking of property. Twenty-Second Corp. of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Oregon Short Line R.R., 36 Utah 238, 103 P.
243, 23 L.R.A. (n.s.) 860, 140 Am. St. R. 819
(1909).
Where a railroad attempts, without lawful
authority, to use part of a street for a switch
track, in such manner as to become a public
and private nuisance, plaintiff, though a private citizen, upon a showing of special damage,
is entitled to an injunction. Cereghino v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 26 Utah 467, 73 P. 634, 99
Am. St. R. 843 (1903).
Operation of railroad switch track over property in city, which resulted in shaking of
ground by the passage of engines and cars, and
caused smoke and noise in close proximity to
the premises of a property owner, constituted a
nuisance within R.S. 1898, § 3506. Stockdale
v. Rio Grande W. Ry., 28 Utah 201, 77 P. 849
(1904).
Damage consequent upon construction and
usual operation ofrailroad commences, for purposes of time to commence suit, from the time
the road is constructed and put in operation,
with but one right of action therefor which
must be commenced within the time allowed
by law from such date. Johnson v. Utah-Idaho
Cent. Ry., 68 Utah 309, 249 P. 1036 (1926).

Reasonable use.
What is actually a nuisance which is actionable depends upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. Noises,. odors, gatherings of
crowds of people may or may not be an actionable nuisance depending upon the times and
places in which they occur. Brough v. Ute
Stampede Ass'n, 105 Utah 446, 142 P.2d 670
(1943).
"Anything . . . . offensive to the senses," as
used in this section, does not mean "anything
at all which any person considers offensive";
the test of whether use of the property constitutes a nuisance is the reasonableness of the
use complained of in the particular locality and
in the manner and under the circumstances of
the case. Cannon v. Neuberger, 1 Utah 2d 396,
268 P.2d 425 (1954); Hatch v. W.S. Hatch Co.,
3 Utah 2d 295, 283 P.2d 217 (1955).
What constitutes an actionable nuisance in
law under this section is always a question of
degree. And the test of whether the use of the
property constitutes a nuisance is the reasonableness of the use complained of in the particular locality and in the manner and under the
circumstances of the case. Dahl v. Utah Oil
Ref. Co., 71 Utah 1, 262 P. 269 (1927).
In determining reasonableness of use of
property, the question is not whether a reasonable person in plaintiff's or defendant's posi-
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tion would regard the invasion as unreasonable, but whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole situation impartially
and objectively, would consider it unreasonable. Hatch v. W.S. Hatch Co., 3 Utah 2d 295,
283 P.2d 217 (1955).

'Removal of natural windbreak.
Landowner who had cleared his land of sagebrush and natural growth in order to plant
crops but who later stopped cultivating it was
not liable for damages caused by sand and dust
which blew onto plaintiffs adjoining property
because of the removal of the growth which, it
was said, provided a natural windbreak; nor
was plaintiff entitled to abatement of the alleged nuisance since defendant could hardly
stop the wind or replace the sagebrush. Robinson v. Whitelaw, 12 Utah 2d 240, 364 P.2d
1085 (1961).
Road transportation business.
Fact that noisy industrial operations other
than those sought to be enjoined are taking
place in area in question bears only upon
whether defendant's activities are reasonable
in that particular locality and not upon
whether a nuisance exists; no actionable nuisance from defendants' road oil and tar transportation business was established in suit in
which trial court found plaintiffs residence to
be located in one of the most highly industrialized areas in the state. Hatch v. W.S. Hatch
Co., 3 Utah 2d 295, 283 P.2d 217 (1955).
Sound equipment.
Allegations, in complaint seeking injunction
and damages, that defendant's sound equipment and vacuum cleaners caused "great and
unusual noises" and "loud and unusual noises"
were sufficient as against contention on demurrer that they were mere conclusions of the
pleader. Thompson v. Anderson, 107 Utah 331,
153 P.2d 665 (1944).
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Judicial notice could be taken of noise of
power saw and sound equipment, such noise
being within the common experience of everyone. Thompson v. Anderson, 107 Utah 331, 153
P.2d 665 (1944).

Temporary or continuing nuisance.
If parties so elect, either by agreement or by
acquiescence, court can permit recovery of
damages as for a permanent injury in an action
for damages for a recurring nuisance, since
such procedure would tend to lessen litigation,
and, once and for all, determine the respective
rights of the private parties. Thackery v.
Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437, 231
P. 813 (1924).
The measure of damages for the maintenance of a recurrent nuisance is the depreciation of the market value of the property affected. The same measure of damages applies
to permanent,
uninterrupted
nuisances.
Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co.,
104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943).
Even though a nuisance is not in existence
at the time suit is filed, or is abated after suit
is filed, court has jurisdiction to grant injunction where there is a reasonable apprehension
that the nuisance will be created or will be
renewed. Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n, 105
Utah 446, 142 P.2d 670 (1943).
Trees.
Trees are not nuisances subject to abatement
in equity, or subject to actions at law for damages, merely because leaves, twigs or even
branches may be blown from them onto neighbors' lots; courts may require that trees be
topped and trimmed and that deadwood and
branches be removed to overcome the danger of
the trees being blown over. Cannon v.
Neuberger, 1 Utah 2d 396, 268 P.2d 425
(1954).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances

§ 1 et seq.

C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 1 et seq.
A.L.R. - Keeping pigs as a nuisance, 2
A.L.R.3d 931.
Keeping poultry as a nuisance, 2 A.L.R.3d
965.
Motorbus or truck terminal as nuisance, 2
A.L.R.3d 1372.
Electric generating plant or transformer station as nuisance, 4 A.L.R.3d 902.
Saloons or taverns as nuisance, 5 A.L.R.3d
989.
Keeping of dogs as enjoinable nuisance, 11
A.L.R.3d 1399.
Age and mentality of child as affecting appli-

cation of attractive nuisance doctrine, 16
A.L.R.3d 25.
Abutting owner's liability for injury from ice
formed on sidewalk by discharge of precipitation due to artificial conditions on premises, 18
A.L.R.3d 428.
Private owner's liability to trespassing children for mJury sustained by sledding,
tobogganing, skiing, skating, or otherwise
sliding on his land, 19 A.L.R.3d 184.
Institution for the punishment or rehabilitation of criminals, delinquents, or alcoholics as
enjoinable nuisance, 21 A.L.R.3d 1058.
Gun club, or shooting gallery or range, as
nuisance, 26 A.L.R.3d 661.
Rights and liabilities of adjoining land-
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owners as to trees, shrubbery, or similar plants
growing on boundary line, 26 A.L.R.3d 1372.
Keeping horses as nuisance, 27 A.L.R.3d
627.
Punitive damages in actions based on nuisance, 31 A.L.R.3d 1346.
Children's playground as nuisance, 32
A.L.R.3d 1127.
Billboards and other outdoor advertising
signs as civil nuisance, 38 A.L.R.3d 647.
Modern status of rules as to balance of convenience or social utility as affecting relief
from nuisance, 40 A.L.R.3d 601.
Liability of owner or proprietor for injury or
death caused by collision with glass door,
panel, or wall, 41 A.L.R.3d 176.
Operation of incinerator as nuisance, 41
A.L.R.3d 1009.
Laundry or dry cleaning establishment as
nuisance, 41 A.L.R.3d 1236.
Automobile racetrack or drag strip as nuisance, 41 A.L.R.3d 1273.
"Coming to nuisance" as a defense or estoppel, 42 A.L.R.3d 344.
'
Use of set gun, trap, or similar device on defendant's own property, 47 A.L.R.3d 646.
Liability of vendor or grantor of real estate
for personal injury to purchaser or third person
due to defective condition of premises, 48
A.L.R.3d 1027.
Residential swimming pools as nuisance, 49
A.L.R.3d 545.
Public swimming pool as nuisance, 49
A.L.R.3d 652.

78-38-2.

Preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent, correct, or reduce effects of polluting
practices, 49 A.L.R.3d 1239.
Gasoline or other fuel storage tanks as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 209.
Exhibition of obscene motion pictures as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 969.
Liability of oil and gas lessee or operator for
injuries to or death of livestock, 51 A.L.R.3d
304.
Evidence as to Ringlemann Chart observations, 51 A.L.R.3d 1026.
Right of one compelled to discontinue business or activity constituting nuisance to indemnity from successful plaintiff, 53 A.L.R.3d
873.
Zoo as nuisance, 58 A.L.R.3d 1126.
Pornoshops or similar places disseminating
obscene materials as nuisance, 58 A.L.R.3d
1134.
Interference with radio or television reception as nuisance, 58 A.L.R.3d 1205.
Attractive nuisance doctrine as applied to
trees, shrubs, and the like, 59 A.L.R.3d 848.
Right to maintain action to enjoin public
nuisance as affected by existence of pollution
control agency, 60 A.L.R.3d 665.
Liability of owner of dog known by him to be
vicious for injuries to trespasser, 64 A.L.R.3d
1039.
I
Animals as attractive nuisance, 64 A.L.R.3d
1069.
Key Numbers. - Nuisance e=> 1 et seq.

Right of action for waste -

Damages.

If a guardian, tenant for life or years, joint tenant or tenant in common, of
real property commits waste thereon, any person aggrieved by the waste may
bring an action against him therefor, in which action there may be a judgment for treble damages.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-38-2.

Cross-References. - Waste by tenant as
unlawful detainer, § 78-36-3.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 78 Am. Jur. 2d Waste§ 1 et
seq.
C.J.S. - 93 C.J.S. Waste § 1 et seq.
A.L.R. - Forfeiture of life estate for waste,
16 A.L.R.3d 1344.
What constitutes waste justifying appoint-

ment of receiver of mortgaged property, 55
A.L.R.3d 1041.
Right of contingent remainderman to maintain action for damages for waste, 56 A.L.R.3d
677.
Key Numbers. - Waste e=> 1 et seq.
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Right of action for injuries to trees

78-38-4.5

Damage.

Any person who cuts down or carries off any wood or underwood, tree or
timber, or girdles or otherwise injures any tree [or] timber on the land of
another person, or on the street or highway in front of any person's house,
town or city lot, or cultivated grounds, or on the commons or public grounds of
any city or town, or on the street or highway in front thereof, without lawful
authority, is liable to the owner of such land, or to such city or town, for treble
the amount of damages which may be assessed therefor in a civil action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-38-3.
Cross-References.
- Cities may plant

trees in streets, parks and public grounds,
§ 10-8-10.
Heritage trees, preservation, §§ 63-11-57 to
63-11-61.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Trespass.
-Innocent
mistake.
Tueble damages should not be awarded
where the trespass was committed through an

innocent mistake as to boundary or location of
a tract of land. Pehrson v. Saderup, 28 Utah 2d
77, 498 P.2d 648 (1972).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 52 Am. Jur. 2d Logs and
Timber §§ 126, 135 et seq.
C.J.S. - 87 C.J.S. Trespass §§ 121, 126 et
seq.
A.L.R. - Rights and liabilities of adjoining

78-38-4.

landowners as to trees, shrubbery, or similar
plants growing on boundary line, 26 A.L.R.3d
1372.
Key Numbers. - Trespass e=> 61.

Limited damages in certain cases.

Nothing in the next preceding section[§ 78-38-3] authorizes the recovery of
more than the just value of the timber taken from uncultivated woodland for
the repair of a public highway or bridge upon the land, or adjoining it.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-38-4.

Cross-References. - Protection of highways, Chapter 12 of Title 27.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 40 C.J.S. Highways § 180.
Key Numbers. - Highways e=> 109.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways,
Streets and Bridges §§ 189, 190.

78-38-4.5.

Proof of ownership required to harvest or transport forest products or native vegetation - Definitions - Requirements for proof of ownership.

(1) It is unlawful for any person, firm, company, partnership, corporation,
or business to harvest or transport timber, forest products, or other native
vegetation without proof of ownership. For purposes of this chapter:
(a) "Forest products" means any tree or portion thereof before it is
manufactured into dimensional lumber, timbers, and ties, or mill peeled
and made into power poles or house logs, including but not limited to
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coniferous and deciduous trees, Christmas trees, sawlogs, poles, posts,
pulp logs, and fuelwood; and
(b) "Native vegetation" means all other forest, desert, or rangeland
vegetation including but not limited to shrubs, flora, roots, bulbs, and
seed.
(2) Proof of ownership requires possession of:
(a) a contract, permit, or other writing issued by the landowner or
proper state or federal agency;
(b) a bill of sale, or other sales receipt;
(c) a bill of lading or product load receipt;
(d) a ticket issued by the seller authorizing harvesting or removal; or
(e) any other legal instrument.
(3) The document required in Subsection (2) shall be issued by the landowner or proper state or federal agency and shall provide the following information:
(a) date of execution;
(b) name and address of person authorized to harvest or transport the
products, if different from the purchaser;
(c) a legal or other sufficient description of the property from which the
products are harvested or removed;
(d) the estimated amount or volume, species, and other pertinent information regarding the products harvested or transported;
(e) the delivery or scaling point;
(f) the name and address of the purchaser or the products;
(g) the name and address of the landowner, agency, or vendor; and
(h) an expiration date.
History: C. 1953, 78-38-4.5, enacted by L.
1983,ch.203,§
1; 1986,ch.93, § 1; 1987,ch.
212, § 1.
Amendment Notes. The 1987 amendment
so rewrote this section as to make a detailed
analysis impracticable.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1983, ch. 203, § 2

78-38-4.6.

provided: "This act shall take effect on approval." Approved March 9, 1983.
Cross-References. - Public utilities, Title
54.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

Enforcement.

Any peace officer specified in§ 77-la-1, or law enforcement officer, ranger,
or special agent of the United States Forest Service or the United States
Bureau of Land Management may:
(1) stop any vehicle or means of conveyance, including common carriers, containing timber, forest products, or native vegetation upon any
road or highway of this state for the purpose of making an inspection and
investigation bµt may not unduly detain a driver of such vehicle or means
of conveyance;
(2) inspect the timber, forest product, or native vegetation in any vehicle, or other means of conveyance, including common carrier, to determine whether the provisions of this chapter have been complied with;
(3) seize and hold any timber, forest product, or native vegetation harvested, removed, or transported in violation of this chapter; and
(4) sell or dispose of the timber, forest product, or native vegetation as
provided by rule by the appropriate agency.
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History: C. 1953, 78-38-4.6, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 212, § 2.

78-38-4.7.

Transportation of forest products or native vegetation into or through the state.

Timber, forest products, or native vegetation transported into or through
the state must be accomanied by a shipping permit or proof of ownership.
History: C. 1953, § 78-38-4.7, enacted by
L. 1987, ch. 212, § 3.

78-38-4.8.

Exemptions.

The provisions of this chapter do not apply to the transportation of:
().) wood chips, sawdust, and bark;
(2) products transported by the owner of the property or his agent from
which the products were removed; or
(3) "products for personal comsumption incidental to camping and picnicking which is limited to the amount:
(a) needed for the duration of the picnic or campout; and
(b) used at the campsite.
History: C. 1953, § 78-38-4.8, enacted by
L. 1987, ch. 212, § 4.

78-38-4.9.

Violation

as a misdemeanor.

Violation of §§ 78-38-4.5 through 78-38-4.9 is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, § 78-38-4.9, enacted by
L. 1987, ch. 212, § 5.

78-38-5.

Cross-References. - Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

Manufacturing facility in operation over three
years - Limited application of nuisance provisions.

(1) Notwithstanding §§ 78-38-1 and 76-10-803, no manufacturing facility
or the operation thereof shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, by
virtue of any changed conditions in and about the locality thereof after the
same has been in operation for more than three years when such manufacturing facility or the operation thereof was not a nuisance at the time the operation thereof began; provided, the manufacturing facility does not increase the
condition asserted to be a nuisance and that the provisions of this subsection
shall not apply whenever a nuisance results from the negligent or improper
operation of any such manufacturing facility.
(2) The provisions of Subsection (1) of this section shall not affect or defeat
the right of any person to retover damages for any injuries or damage sustained on account of any pollution of, or change in the condition of, the waters
of any stream or on account of any overflow of the lands of any person.
(3) Any and all ordinances now or hereafter adopted by any county or municipal corporation in which such manufacturing facility is located, which
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makes the operation thereof a nuisance or providing for an abatement thereof
as a nuisance in the circumstances set forth in this section are null and void;
provided, however, that the provisions of this subsection shall not apply whenever a nuisance results from the negligent or improper operation of any such
manufacturing facility.
History: L. 1981, ch. 190, § 1.
Cross-References. - Water pollution control, Chapter 11 of Title 26.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
-Special or private law.
Applicability of section.
-Action filed before section's enactment.
Expanded and negligent operations.
-''Nuisance.''

Constitutionality.
-Special or private law.
This section is not a special or private law in
violation of Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26. Pratt
v. Hercules, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 773 (D. Utah
1982).
Applicability

of section.

-Action filed before section's enactment.
This section was applicable to a nuisance action against a manufacturer where the section
was enacted after the action was filed and before trial and entry of a final judgment; such
application was not a retroactive application in

violation of§ 68-3-3, and did not violate Utah
Constitution's prohibition against special or
private laws, Art. VI, Sec. 26. Pratt v. Hercules, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 773 (D. Utah 1982).

Expanded and negligent operations.
-"Nuisance."
Where plaintiffs' claim of nuisance failed to
state a claim under § 78-38-1 as a matter of
law, there was no "nuisance" which could be
caused by negligent or expanded operations
and thereby be removed from the protection
offered resident manufacturers under this section. Pratt v. Hercules, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 773
(D. Utah 1982).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative
Survey - 1981, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 125, 186.

78-38-6.

"Manufacturing

facility" defined.

As used in this act, "manufacturing facility" means any factory, plant, or
other facility including its appurtenances, where the form of raw materials,
processed materials, commodities, or other physical objects is converted or
otherwise changed into other materials, commodities, or physical objects or
where such materials, commodities, or physical objects are combined to form a
new material, commodity, or physical object ..
History: L. 1981, ch. 190, § 2.
Meaning of "this act". - The term "this
act," referred to in this section, means Laws

1981, Chapter
190, which
§§ 78-38-5 and 78-38-6.
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Agricultural operation of over three years duration - Application of nuisance provisions limited.

(1) Notwithstanding §§ 78-38-1 and 76-10-803, no agricultural operation,
any of its appurtenances or the operation thereof shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, by virtue of any changed conditions in and about the
locality thereof after the same has been in operation for more than three years
when such operation, its appurtenances or the operation thereof was not a
nuisa_nce at the time the operation thereof began; provided, the agricultural
operation does not increase or intensify the condition asserted to be a nuisance
and that the provisions of this subsection shall not apply whenever a nuisance
results from the negligent or improper operation of any such operation, or any
of its appurtenances.
(2) The provisions of Subsection (1) of this section shall not affect or defeat
the right of any person to recover damages for any injuries or damage sustained on account of any pollution of, or change in the condition of, the waters
of any stream or on account of any overflow of the lands of any person.
(3) Any and all ordinances now or hereafter adopted by any county or municipal corporation in which such operation is located, which makes the operation thereof or its appurtenances a nuisance or providing for an abatement
thereof as a nuisance in the circumstances set forth in this section are null
and void; provided, however, that the provisions of this subsection shall not
apply whenever a nuisance results from the negligent or improper operation
of any such operation.
History: L. 1981, ch. 154, § 1.
Cross-References. - Agriculture, Title 4.

Water pollution control, Chapter 11 of Title
26.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative
Survey - 1981, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 125, 186.

78-38-8.

"Agricultural

operation"

defined.

As used in this act, "agricultural operation" means any facility for the
production for commercial purposes of crops, livestock, poultry, livestock products, or poultry products.
History: L. 1981, ch. 154, § 2.
Meaning of "this act". - The term "this
act," referred to in this section, means Laws

1981,

Chapter

154,

§§ 78-38-7 and 78-38-8.
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Agriculture, Title 4.

